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Introduction
The Belgian armed forces are approaching a crossroads. As a result 
of their age pyramid, their overall number is set to drop precipitously 
in the years ahead. By 2025 more than half of the current personnel 
will have retired. In the same timeframe, several of the major 
platforms currently in use – most notably the F-16 fighter fleet – will 
face the end of their service lives. Major investments that produced 
impressive returns are thus set to be unwound. If the peace 
dividend of the 1990s were to keep flowing, these trends would 
not be overly disturbing. But as thunderclouds gather over Europe’s 
neighbourhood and the United States rebalances to the Asia-Pacific 
region, this is no longer the case. To take the relative security in 
Europe for granted would be a disservice to the next generation. 
The Belgian armed forces therefore face an existential question: to 
silently accept past trends and wither away, or to actively prepare 
for the future by investing in a nimble force structure and make the 
case for its continued relevance in the 21st century.
This Policy Brief argues that Belgium must enter yet another 
round of defence reforms. As this transformation will be the most 
fundamental one since the Charlier plans and the suspension 
of conscription, it will touch on matters as diverse as finances, 
multinational cooperation and future capability requirements. But at 
heart, this analysis builds on a strategic vision of how to connect the 
national defence posture to the safeguarding of all Belgian citizens 
and their shared political ambitions. This vision is premised on two 
core ideas. Firstly, continued investment in defence is warranted 
even in times of austerity. This is no ‘guns versus butter’ argument, 
but rather a future-oriented call for intergenerational solidarity. 
Secondly, any defence reform must strive towards delivering the 
next government(s) with the broadest range of policy options. This 
implies that further specialisation – in particular in non-combat 
capabilities – must be resisted.
Defence reforms cannot occur in a political vacuum. On the basis 
Belgium is on the cusp of its next defence reform. While the security landscape 
throughout Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond 
deteriorates, the armed forces face numerous 
challenges. Most importantly, the next defence 
plan needs to recalibrate the force structure in 
function of political ambitions and budgetary 
realities. This Policy Brief argues that Belgium 
must embrace a nimble but broad-spectrum 
force. Any future structure must encompass 
agile land forces as well as a modern combat air 
force, without neglecting the need to safeguard 
a sizeable navy and invest in cyber capabilities. 
European cooperation should be pursued 
wherever possible while recognising that this 
necessitates budgetary convergence. For Belgium 
this means the investment budget needs to grow 
significantly in order to acquire interoperable 
but self-owned assets. Such a choice can be 
justified on the recognition that defence is not 
just about expeditionary operations, but also 
economic stimulus, intergenerational solidarity 
and strategic insurance: maintaining the ability 
to respond to whatever the future may bring.
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of in-depth interviews with defence experts of all political 
families, this analysis will proceed from a consensus view on the 
four key political objectives of Belgian defence efforts. Firstly, 
Belgium will remain an enthusiastic supporter of European 
defence integration. A resolution recently adopted by the Belgian 
Parliament provides ample evidence in this regard (Belgische 
Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2013). Secondly, Belgium 
must maintain a minimally credible contribution to the Atlantic 
Alliance. While this follows from multiple treaty commitments, 
the deep justification is that any hypothetical choice to do 
otherwise would represent a complete and costly reversal of 
Belgium’s international orientation since the Second World War. 
Thirdly, any Belgian government will be interested in a versatile 
military instrument in support of its foreign policy. This typically 
entails the ability to participate in crisis response operations 
and to provide military assistance to African partner countries. 
Fourthly and finally, the armed forces also have a latent function 
as security insurance provider to the Belgian population. For 
addressing any major incident on Belgian territory, or in Belgian 
territorial waters, airspace and perhaps even cyberspace, the 
armed forces represent the ultimate responder.
The typical structure of a defence planning exercise is to start 
with an analysis of the strategic environment, then to distil an 
overview of the capabilities required for the assigned mission, 
and finally to request the financial resources required. Yet given 
the prevalent uncertainty of the future international environment 
and the past failures to honour defence resourcing commitments, 
this analysis turns this structure upside down. In what follows, 
we first analyse the budgetary framework and its consequences. 
Secondly we discuss how multinational cooperation can help 
mitigate the financial challenges the armed forces confront. 
Thirdly we zoom in on the debate about investment priorities. 
Why embrace such transparency, one might ask. Belgian defence
The Budgetary Framework and Its Consequences
The downward trend of Belgian defence expenditure has been 
the main force driving the transformation of the armed forces. 
For multiple decades, the defence budget has been shrinking in 
purchasing power as well as relative to the size of the Belgian 
economy, dropping from 3.35% of GDP in 1980 to approximately 
1% at present (IISS 1980/2014). This budgetary trend has 
consistently outpaced reform programmes. As a result, the 
share of personnel costs has risen while investment space has 
decreased (Struys 2014, p. 14). Relative to its neighbouring 
countries, the budgetary situation in which the Belgian military 
finds itself is extremely serious. Some critics go as far as calling 
it ‘an unusually well-armed pension fund’ (Rachman 2013). The 
principal problem is the lack of investment space to prepare for 
an uncertain future.
This has entailed the gradual downsizing of the force structure 
and a corresponding loss in potential output level. Even after 
the suspension of conscription, the size of the professional 
force has been steadily falling from 47,200 in 1995 to 30,700 at 
present. Under present recruitment and retirement parameters 
it is forecast to continue falling to approximately 25,000 or 
below. The same can be said about the equipment platforms in 
use: the number of ships, aircraft and vehicles has been falling 
precipitously. While it is intellectually appealing to believe that 
fewer professional forces of higher quality are to be preferred to 
a larger but less useable force, it bears emphasising that Belgium
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Belgium France Germany Netherlands
Defence expenditure as % of 
government spending 
(including pensions)
1.98 3.40 2.73 2.67
Personnel expenditure as % of 
defence total 77.3 49.1 46.4 56.9
Investment expenditure as % 
of defence total 4.1 30.6 19.7 14.3
Figure 1: Belgian defence data in perspective (based on EDA 2014)
reforms have traditionally been conducted in relative secrecy. 
Yet the ensuing plans have often generated considerable public 
controversy, as military installations had to be closed and 
employment opportunities evaporated. In addition, the lack of 
meaningful debate about military affairs has not shielded the 
armed forces from being hollowed out. This Policy Brief therefore 
seeks to illuminate a sometimes technical and arcane debate 
that is nonetheless at the foundation of the Rechtsstaat as we 
know it.
is dropping under qualitative thresholds as well. As one NATO 
defence planner with long memories explains: ‘In 1985 we knew 
that a Belgian brigade was the qualitative equivalent of a German 
or a U.S. brigade. But with the partial exception of the Belgian 
air force, this is no longer the case: the means are simply no 
longer there!’ The past decision to scrap battle tanks and heavy 
artillery has de facto incapacitated the Belgian land forces in the 
combined arms arena.
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A country’s operational level of ambition always fluctuates in 
function of its geopolitical environment. Yet what Belgium faces 
is no longer a merely quantitative recalibration of its defence 
posture. It is the potential loss of its qualitative ability to 
think beyond token contributions and hence to be part of the 
international community’s strategic brains. In addition, these 
macro-budgetary trends have dire internal consequences. The 
Belgian armed forces are struggling hard to keep up morale in 
the face of endless cuts. Not unlike the situation in many other 
European countries (see e.g. AFMP 2013), military confidence 
in the political direction of the department is nearing the point 
of collapse. Moreover, the constrained investment space is 
triggering ever more serious rivalry amongst the different armed 
services. Keeping in with Belgian political culture, this also has 
a linguistic dimension, as it becomes increasingly difficult to 
satisfy the desire to spread bases symmetrically across north 
and south (cf. Wagener 2011). In sum, the budgetary trend has 
sown the seeds for a brewing civil-military crisis. The resignation 
of the former Chief of Defence General Charles-Henri Delcour 
bears witness to this.
In order to put this into a broader perspective, it is of critical 
importance to understand that defence spending is not a waste 
but in fact produces a significant economic return on investment 
(cf. Flamant 2014). It goes without saying that the principal 
military bases act as major employment poles throughout the 
periphery of the Belgian territory. In addition, the armed forces 
provide a range of services to the nation – one only needs to think 
of foreign intelligence, bomb disposal and search and rescue 
tasks. Even more important is the issue of economic offsets 
negotiated for major procurement contracts. It has been argued, 
for instance, that the Belgian aeronautical industry would in all 
likelihood no longer have existed without the co-production 
and maintenance obligations contained in the Belgian F-16 
purchases in 1975 and 1983 (FOD Economie 2008, p. 83). In 
total, the economic return of the F-16 programme is estimated to 
amount to approximately 4.17 billion EUR in Belgian added value 
(data obtained from FOD Economie). Similar arguments can be 
made about other types of equipment of course, albeit on a 
more modest scale. In total, the members of the Belgian Security 
and Defence Industry association employ approximately 15,000 
men and women, many in highly skilled jobs. This generates an 
overwhelmingly export-driven annual turnover of 1.5 billion EUR. 
As such, there exists no contradiction in spending on defence 
in times of austerity: it constitutes the prototypical example 
of countercyclical economic stimulus. It is no coincidence that 
the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has been 
labelled a critical force of innovation (Mazzucato 2013, p. 
133). The internet, GPS, artificial intelligence – in other words, 
everything that makes a smartphone ‘smart’ – have all been 
driven by defence research, development and technology. While 
industrial policy is best coordinated on a European level, this can 
only be successful if all member states commit themselves to 
sufficient purchase orders.
The deeper function of defence spending is of course not to 
subsidise Belgian industry or to reduce unemployment figures. 
The defence budget can perhaps best be conceptualised as a 
strategic insurance policy. Not only does it enable a state to 
contribute to the stability of the international system through 
deterrence and crisis response operations, it also forms the 
ultimate stopgap solution for any unexpected disaster that may 
befall the population. One can of course not plan for the truly 
unexpected, yet the basic idea remains that the armed forces 
offer any government the means to enforce a state monopoly 
over the legitimate use of force. In addition, they provide a 
reservoir of manpower, technological know-how and logistical 
skills for confronting whatever danger lurking behind the corner 
of the unknown. As with any insurance premium, the society 
that pays for it can opt for different levels of coverage, but it 
must ultimately pay for insurance or risk disaster. This is why 
the defence budget merits a public debate about costs, risks 
and benefits.
At present, the Belgian armed forces are financed on the basis of 
an envelope budget. This means that within its annual budget, 
the ministry has a relatively free hand on how to apportion its 
expenses, with the exception that investment contracts require 
governmental approval. This has led some to criticise the level 
of transparency in defence expenditure. In particular, the Belgian 
Court of Audit has repeatedly voiced complaints about the 
unclear financial implications of operational engagements (see 
e.g. Rekenhof 2010, p. 20). While it is clear that this reputation 
for budgetary wizardry makes some ministerial cabinets highly 
suspicious of what the defence staff proposes, the key problem 
is that the quasi-permanent shrinking of the envelope makes 
long-term defence planning impossible. Given that investment 
dossiers require governmental approval anyway, one option 
would be to split the defence budget into an annual envelope 
covering personnel and working expenses and a multi-annual 
investment budget supporting different capability programmes. 
Such a system would be somewhat akin to the French Loi de 
programmation militaire and provide planners with a long-term 
framework within which competing capability requirements 
can be balanced. Given the strategic returns, the auctioning of 
long-term ‘defence bonds’ may help finance such a multi-annual 
investment budget.
The Siren Song of Multinational Cooperation
Multinational cooperation has long been touted as the answer to 
the budgetary woes of European military establishments (see e.g. 
Dickow et al 2012, Giegerich and Nicoll 2012). At the same time, 
it is clear that the idea of European defence cooperation has all 
too often been used as a smokescreen masking the dramatic 
reduction of capabilities. The former Director-General of the 
EU Military Staff, Lt.-Gen. Ton van Osch, famously noted that 
the balance between past defence cuts and the financial gains 
realised through European pooling and sharing corresponded to 
100 to 1. In other words, European forces are not being enhanced 
at all: they are falling off a cliff! In addition, multinational defence 
collaboration entails important implications in terms of national 
sovereignty (cf. AIV 2012). While Belgium may feel comfortable 
with the idea of shared European sovereignty, this is not the case 
for most of our European partners. More and more countries 
contemplate the renationalisation of defence: the recent French 
Livre Blanc (2013, p. 61) goes as far as calling the option of an 
integrated European defence ‘illusory’. So where does this leave 
us?
Multinational cooperation is instrumental in squeezing the 
maximum output from available resources. The example of the 
European Air Transport Command is illustrative: the flexible 
integration of French, German, Spanish and Benelux air transport 
assets has reportedly delivered a 15% productivity gain (Gros-
Verheyde 2013). This is by no means a sudden discovery: the 
community of European Participating Air Forces have long 
benefitted from the common configuration and maintenance of 
their F-16 fighter fleets. In keeping with its particular geopolitical 
position on the European continent, Belgium has built a 
reputation of being at the avant-garde of multinational defence 
initiatives (cf. Parrein and Sauer 2013). The integration of the 
Belgian and Dutch navies serves as one of the most far-reaching 
examples of deep cooperation: only the effective opening of fire 
necessitates recourse to national command authorities.
At the same time, it is clear that European cooperation does 
not absolve its member states from the responsibility to share 
the burden in financial commitments as well as in operational 
risk. As the president of the European Parliament’s security and 
defence subcommittee pointed out: ‘ce n’est certainement pas en 
abdiquant au niveau national qu’on entraînera et construira au 
niveau européen.’ Furthermore, intra-European disagreements 
about defence questions suggest that for the foreseeable future 
the scope of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy will 
be limited to the soft end of the crisis management spectrum 
and a limited degree of defence industrial regulation. Even in 
slow-motion crises such as the one in the Sahel region, the EU 
manifestly fell short of its own ambitions of acting preventively, 
ultimately leading France to act under a national flag. And if 
European defence industrial cooperation is to materialise, the 
same logic applies: the return is reserved for those willing to 
invest.
The issue of burden-sharing is also a major pre-occupation of the 
NATO defence planning community. The decision of the U.S. to 
shoulder no more than 50% of NATO capability targets resulted 
in important shortfalls for meeting potential collective defence 
scenarios. Quite apart from leading to extreme nervousness 
amongst the Eastern European Allies, this also increases the 
Alliance’s reliance on nuclear deterrence. Recent events in 
Ukraine indicate that these worries are not merely hypothetical 
and suggest an impending shift in acquisition priorities. Even 
if the methodology for measuring burden-sharing may be 
revised, it is clear that Alliance commitments entail an obligation 
to maintain a broad mix of forces, including combat, combat 
support and combat service support elements. Yet the NATO 
defence planning community expresses strong doubts as to how 
Belgium will be able to sustain a balanced force structure without 
a significant increase in capital investment to replace its major 
combat platforms.
What are the implications of the above for any future Belgian 
government? The dynamics of multinational cooperation favour 
those countries able to bring real capabilities to the negotiating 
table. From this perspective, Belgium must retain its own assets 
wherever possible (i.e. core capabilities for all services) and invest 
in shares of those assets it cannot acquire nationally (e.g. space-
based capabilities, joint ISR etc). In addition, it is of paramount 
importance that as much of the equipment that the Belgian 
armed forces use is fully interoperable with that of like-minded 
partner countries. While the number of platforms in use may be 
limited in comparison to larger partners, long-term multinational 
cooperation also entails a commitment to proportional budgetary 
convergence. If Belgium continues to undershoot defence 
investment targets, it will eventually be disconnected from the 
European train, operationally as well as industrially. The Dutch 
navy is now already advancing technologically at a significantly 
higher tempo than the Belgian one. Unless halted, this leads to 
an ever-higher level of dependency and a subsequent loss of 
decision-making influence.
Investing in Future Capabilities
Given that resources are always finite and that multinational 
cooperation is no panacea, what future capabilities should the 
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Belgian armed forces prioritise? Both the air force and the navy 
will confront major re-equipment challenges in the medium 
term. At the same time, it is of critical importance that these 
investment needs do not crowd out the funding required for 
maintaining agile and versatile land forces and for acquiring 
future capabilities without a clear institutional home. Cyber 
and intelligence capabilities loom particularly large in the 
latter category. Given long procurement timelines and the fact 
that investments will have to be spread over many years, it is 
imperative to approach this exercise with a horizon stretching at 
least to 2030, if not beyond. This section provides an overview of 
the key challenges for designing a new Belgian force structure.
Military equipment has no meaning without well-trained and 
motivated personnel. Balancing the demographical structure 
of the force therefore constitutes the principal challenge for 
the next decade. This is not to say that an even greater share 
of the budget should be spent on personnel: it simply means 
that a clear minimum target size must be set and that further 
downward revisions are resisted at all costs. Determining this 
bounce-back level is clearly a political decision: the size of the 
toolbox essentially reflects different levels of strategic insurance 
coverage. In order to maintain a reasonably broad spectrum of 
core capabilities and live up to widely shared political ambitions, 
a force structure of at least 25,000 men and women must 
be maintained. At the same time, a maximum effort must be 
undertaken to increase recruitment numbers and the retention 
of qualified personnel. A broad geographical distribution of 
bases, more flexible human resources policies and greater use 
of civilian contracts can play a role in meeting this challenge. 
Such a lean personnel structure also necessitates a significant 
compression of corporate overhead and may bolster the need 
for reinvigorating the reserve. Taken together, these choices 
keep the door open to regenerating a larger force again, should 
the security environment deteriorate in the decades ahead. In 
other words, this is the most elementary prudence that any 
government must exercise with the intergenerational well-being 
of its citizens in mind.
Land forces constitute the backbone of any armed force. Land 
power provides the only means to physically secure and control 
the territory on which people live. This makes it of critical 
importance for both expeditionary operations and for coping 
with worst-case scenarios at home. As the total size of the 
force continues to shrink, the Belgian land component will be 
hit hard. It is nonetheless imperative that the land component 
retains the expertise to command brigade units and prepare 
land packages for combined arms operations. Renouncing the 
brigade level de facto means giving up the skill-set to think 
meaningfully about the land domain and the ability to assume 
the lead of an EU Battlegroup. Whether Belgium will ever actually 
deploy a brigade by itself is irrelevant: it is the ability to plug 
into multinational command frameworks that counts (cf. King 
2011). In addition, the land component can be redesigned in 
terms of modular, company-sized building blocks grouped into 
graduated readiness pools. The land forces could then be built 
around three clusters: a paracommando-based capacity for 
immediate reaction, inaccessible terrain and supporting special 
operations; a flexible light motorised capacity based on Dingo 
vehicles; and a heavy capacity based on Piranha vehicles with 
meaningful direct fire capacity. In turn, the Special Forces Group 
warrants expansion and supporting air assets. Although most 
of the equipment of this future land component has already 
been purchased, this materiel will require regular modernisation 
to remain technologically up-to-date and digitally networked. 
What is perhaps needed most is a flexible mindset for exploring 
the national attractiveness and international added value that 
Belgian land forces can offer.
The Belgian navy has been structurally integrated into the Royal 
Netherlands Navy. The Admiral Benelux combined naval staff 
effectively constitutes one of the most far-reaching examples 
of multinational defence cooperation. The logical corollary is 
that Belgium has only limited room for purely national decision-
making. The Belgian naval component has de facto specialised 
in ocean-going escort and mine-countermeasure functions (built 
around two Karel Doorman-class frigates and six Tripartite-
class mine hunters). As these vessels will eventually require 
replacements, the key challenge is to maintain a sizeable fleet 
able to contribute to the security of the lines of communication 
on which Belgian trade depends. One possible avenue to explore 
is to opt for modular sloops-of-war modelled on the British Royal 
Navy’s Black Swan concept (DCDC 2012). Such a group system 
would be able to carry different capability packages – manned 
and unmanned – depending on the mission at hand. As such, it 
would lend itself to continued multinational cooperation with the 
Dutch and other navies while retaining multiple functionalities 
and – most important – a critical threshold of combat ships 
sailing under Belgian flag. Exploring such options necessitates 
significant exploratory research and innovative ship design in 
a multinational framework with a view to procurement close to 
2030.
The Belgian air force presents the most significant challenge 
over the medium term. At present, it is primarily built around 
a multirole F-16 fighter capability and a tactical air transport 
capability. The C-130 transport fleet will be replaced in the coming 
years by a smaller number of significantly larger Airbus A400M 
aircraft. But approximately ten years from now, the F-16 fleet 
will approach retirement: the platform was designed for 8,000 
flying hours. This means that further life extension efforts would 
carry a significant price tag. Rising costs are further amplified by 
the fact that the present partners in the European Participating 
Air Forces in the F-16 programme (i.e. Norway, the Netherlands 
and in all likelihood Denmark) will be making the switch to 
the F-35 successor system. As the F-16 at present constitutes 
the trump capability of the Belgian armed forces, this poses a 
fundamental question about replacement. The fighter capability 
effectively serves four different roles: ensuring the defence of 
Belgian and Allied air space, providing air-ground support in 
expeditionary operations (e.g. Kosovo and Libya), contributing to 
NATO’s nuclear posture and supporting the Belgian aeronautical 
industry. Can Belgium conceivably forego all of these tasks? 
The inability to police its airspace, to give but the obvious 
example, would effectively jeopardise its role as host nation 
of the Euro-Atlantic institutions as foreign powers could then 
intimidate multilateral negotiations unopposed. Moreover, the 
Libya intervention suggests that some operations do enjoy near-
unanimous parliamentary support.
The replacement of the F-16 platform will require a major 
reinvestment in military hardware over an extended period. At 
the same time, not making this investment would have grave 
consequences, ranging from a dramatic loss of diplomatic 
influence and a major blow to the aeronautical industry to the 
abandoning of Belgium’s most potent defence system and 
the undermining of national security over a generational time 
horizon. It is therefore fair to argue that Belgium must meet 
this challenge and plan for a successor system with a gradual 
platform switch foreseen in the mid-2020s. The next government 
must as soon as possible explore all possible options for deep 
multinational cooperation to ensure maximum cost-efficiency 
and launch discussions on industrial return without preference 
for any specific aircraft. Furthermore, not only the F-16 fleet 
will require replacement: the Alpha training jets and B-Hunter 
unmanned aircraft require successor systems as well. As a result, 
variable geometry solutions in international cooperation become 
possible. Last but not least, the Belgian helicopter fleet – and the 
new NH90 system in particular – needs to be well integrated into 
a flexible defence posture. One attractive option is, for example, 
to transform the troop transport version of the NH90 into an 
enabling capability for the Special Forces Group.
These core capabilities of course cannot be separated from 
critical enablers. With regard to the latter, three distinct 
challenges stand out. Firstly, the support provided by the 
medical component already constitutes a major constraint 
on operational engagement. The acute shortage of medical 
doctors represents a serious threat to operational flexibility. 
Secondly, the uncertain strategic environment puts a premium 
on geopolitical and situational understanding. In order to 
minimise the risk of surprise that a small force structure 
entails, the military intelligence service warrants continued 
investment in terms of manpower, information systems and 
access to the appropriate collection capabilities (in particular in 
the area of signals intelligence and geospatial imagery). Thirdly 
and finally, Belgian defence planners must embrace the reality 
that cyberspace has become a new domain in which power is 
exercised. The revolution in electronic networks has effectively 
rendered the notion that conflict may not reach our national 
borders meaningless. If the Belgian armed forces cannot counter 
cyber-attack on critical national infrastructure – offensively if 
need be – they effectively fail in their fundamental mission: to 
protect the society from which they spring. This is why a major 
investment in cyber capabilities is warranted and why the setting 
up of a cyber force should be envisaged, preferably embedded 
in a multinational structure.
Conclusion: A Strategic Vision 
The contours of a future force structure for the Belgian military 
have become apparent. Once more, the armed forces will 
become smaller. Yet in order to fulfil even the most consensual 
political objectives, they must retain a maximum versatility and 
invest in a broad spectrum of core capabilities. It goes without 
saying that all possible avenues for multinational cooperation 
must be explored, but this does not exempt Belgium from 
investing in nationally owned assets and sharing a proportional 
part of the international burden. In the coming decade, this 
means prioritising sound personnel management in function of 
a modular and agile land component and actively preparing for 
an F-16 successor system. In addition, the future of the Belgian 
navy and the acquisition of cyber-capabilities require in-depth 
exploratory studies.
Why must Belgium opt for a balanced force? The justification is 
twofold. On the one hand this choice springs from intellectual 
humility about our ability to predict the future. Throughout the 
1990s and much of the 2000s, the geopolitical environment 
promised to herald an ever more stable and peaceful world. In 
recent years, this evolution is becoming more uncertain. We do 
not know what future operational requirements we will face: this 
is why the Belgian armed forces must invest in a broad range of 
assets and the know-how to regenerate them in larger numbers 
if ever required. A balanced joint structure is also in harmony 
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with Belgian strategic culture and its geopolitical persona. On 
the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that defence 
planning and procurement cycles unfold over a generational 
time-horizon. We can still enjoy the fruits of investments made 
over thirty years ago. By the same logic, it will be the children of 
the present generation of decision-makers who will have to live 
with the consequences of the choices that are made in the years 
ahead. Ultimately the balanced force is about retaining the next 
generation’s ability to act. They may not take it kindly if political 
choices prioritise the present but jeopardise the future.
How can one reconcile this vision with present budgetary 
realities? In the short term it is imperative that the investment 
share of defence expenditure starts growing again. Without the 
willingness to invest, any organisation’s days are numbered. 
This means that a numerically smaller structure of at least 
25,000 men and women must be embraced on the condition 
that the downward trend in defence expenditure is arrested and 
the available Euros get reinvested in future capabilities. If the 
political world has concerns over budgetary transparency, the 
option of splitting defence expenditures into a yearly working 
budget and a multi-annual investment budget can be considered. 
Yet if Belgium is serious about its desire to help build European 
defence, it must face the reality that this implies budgetary 
convergence towards the European average over the medium 
term – and this means approximately 50% higher than it is today. 
Simply put, free riders do not get to have a seat at the table.
The hardest question of course remains: why bother about 
defence? Ever since the end of the Cold War we have grown 
accustomed to the idea that defence is only about long-lasting 
expeditionary operations in faraway countries. But this idea 
is flawed. In a world in which autocratic powers are gaining 
newfound confidence, defence is also about deterrence. In a 
European context characterised by youth unemployment and 
sluggish growth, defence is also about boosting technological 
innovation and safeguarding the industrial base. Ultimately 
defence is all about preparing for history that has not been 
written, and being able to write part of it ourselves. If this sort 
of strategic insurance appeals to the generation of tomorrow, we 
must think about it today.
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